Chayanov's model of peasant household resource allocation and its relevance to Mbere division, eastern Kenya by Ferrand, David

/ M L * 
IDS/WP 276 
CHAYANOV'S MODEL OF PEASANT HOUSEHOLD 
RESOURCE ALLOCATION AND ITS RELEVANCE 
TO MBERE DIVISION, EASTERN KENYA 
By 
Diana M. Hunt 
WORKING PAPER NO.276 
INSTITUTE FOR DEVELOPMENT STUDIES 
UNIVERSITY ,QF NAIROBI 
F ,0/ox 30197 
Nairobi, Kenya 
August 1976 
8NSTITUTE Of 
' is OCT 1981 
P W I I C P ^ ' 
LIBRA** 
Views expressed in this paper are those of the author. They should not be 
interpreted as reflecting the views of the Institute for Development 
Studies or of the University of Nairobi. 
IDS/WP 276 
CHAYANOV'S MODEL OF PEASANT HOUSEHOLD RESOURCE ALLOCATION 
AND ITS RELEVANCE TO MBERE DIVISION, EASTERN KENYA1 
"One of the commonest and most unfortunate difficulties in 
understanding the peasant farm is our characteristic statistical 
method of perceiving and thinking about it. Concepts of 1.78 
horses compared with 8.34 persons of both sexes, 26.15 percent 
without horses, a decline in the average number of livestock 
held (in terms of large ones), depending on a rise in the 
percentage of literacy - these are the images and conceptions 
in which Russian economists are accustomed to think about the 
subject of our inquiry. Nevertheless, we can surely suppose that 
to think in this way about the peasant farm production machine 
is the same as to describe the structure of a modern steam engine 
as consisting of 39 percent Fe, 31 percent Cu, 16 percent II^ O 
and 14- percent various organic substances."^ 
In this paper we consider whether we can identify the key variables 
governing household resource allocation in Mbere Division, Eastern Kenya. 
Our starting point will be Chayanov's theory of peasant household resource 
allocation. Following a brief description of Mbere, we shall, first outline 
the main features of this theory and then consider to what extent the same 
theory can explain the economic behaviour of Mbere households. 
Mbere.is one of six divisions in Kenya which in 1969 was drawn 
into Kenya's newly introduced Special Rural Development Programme. The 
purpose of the programme was to select six ecologically and economically 
diverse rural divisions and to deploy within them exceptional amounts of 
capital and skilled manpower:with a view to identifying development stra-
tegies which, if successful, might' then be replicated in other similar areas 
of Kenya,. Mbere was selected to represent the semi-arid farming systems 
of eastern and south-western Kenya. 
The Kenya Government wishes to generate growth in output and income 
in Mbere as in all regions of the Kenyan economy. There are two ways in 
which it may do this: (i) investment by the public sector in the provision 
of economic infrastructure and social services (i.e. chiefly development 
of roads, expansion of formal education and of health care and pursuit of 
agricultural research geared to the needs of the area) and (ii) direct 
encouragement of productive activity in the private sector chiefly through 
the provision of technical knowledge supplemented by credit and subsidies. 
Direct public sector participation in productive activity is ruled out on 
politico-economic grounds; the state in Kenya usually only participates 
1* . 1 a m grateful to Michael Lipton for his comments on an earlier draft 
of this paper. Responsibility for it as it now stands is, however, entirely mine. 
2._ A.V. Chayanov, "Peasant Farm Organization" in Thorner, Kerblay and 
Smith, eds., A.V. Chayanov: The Theory of Peasant Economy, American Economic 
Association, Irwin, 1966, p. 118. ~ 
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directly in production in high -growth sectors and then normally.:-by taking 
up a 51 percent shareholding. 
Mbere currently holds po high growth prospects. The people of the 
area derive approximately 47 percent of their income from crop production 
and another 17 percent from livestock products. Jt. is a poor area where 
the rains may be expected to fail to:achieve a critical' minimum of 300 mm 
approximately one season in two., known ground water - supplies are poor, soils 
are medium to poor, the topography in much of the area does not permit agri-
cultural mechanisation even should it.be thought economically desirable, 
and predators in the form of wild animals and birds pose a constant threat 
to planted seed and maturing crops. Because, in the past, agricultural 
research in Kenya :focussed on the needs of the high-potential areas and not 
on medium-potential'areas such as- fjbere,:there is still a chronic dearth 
of knowledge of appropriate income-raising recommendations to make to farmers 
in the area. In response to these unattractive farming conditions, it is 
hardly surprising to find a high rate of labour out-migration, especially 
by adult males. At the time of the 1969 census, the adult male-female 
ratio for Mbere S.R.D.P. area was 1:1.27 (in other words there were 27 
per cent more adult females in the area than adult males). The actual 
population in 1969 was 64,500 which over a land area .of 1,630 sq. km. gives 
2 
a mean density of 40 persons/k . 
Given the lack of job opportunities in the towns, it is national 
policy in Kenya to reduce the rate of rural-urban migration,.but only if a 
reliable and reasonably profitable labour use pattern adapted to.conditions 
prevailing in medium-potential areas such as Mbere can be developed will 
the rate of out-migration from these areas decline. The urgency of achieving 
such an improvement is rendered greater by the fact that parts of Western 
and. Central Mbere, and presumably other medium potential areas also, are now 
becoming areas of in-migration for investors from high potential areas 
around Mount Kenya who find that land is is not available for purchase in 
sufficient quantity or at an acceptable price in their own areas. As, due 
to further population increase, more people looking for land are forced 
into areas such as Mbere these areas could be required to absorb a population 
increase above the national average. 
The 1969 population figures suggest that, 4,200 males must be 
attracted back to Mbere before the present population can be regarded as 
being in balance. It would-be a smaller but- still difficult task simply to 
try to prevent a rise in the absolute number of outward migrants. 
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It is only possible to speak of a traditional cropping pattern 
in Mbere if traditional is interpreted loosely. Mbere is far from 
constituting a stagnant agricultural backwater. The last decade has,seen 
considerable agricultural experimentation on individual farms and in 
preceding decades there had already been important changes such as the 
introduction of cotton and tobacco to the division, and the earlier intro-
duction of maize. By the later 1960s and early 1970s the farming pattern 
of the conservative or traditional farmer in Mbere was a risk-averting system 
of mixed cropping aimed at achieving as nearly as possible in the face of a 
hostile climate self-sufficiency in subsistence crops. The main food 
crops are maize, bulrush millet, sorghum, beans, cowpeas and green grams. 
Maize decreases in importance and green grams increase as one moves from 
3 •: •• • -west to, east in the division. Pigeon peas are commonly interplanted with 
other crops, and bananas, and sugar-cane are grown along-stream-beds. 
(Additional planting of bananas in deep holes away from stream beds developed 
in the later 1960s and is now encouraged by the extension service.) Crops 
are grown in a wide range of combination's; maize is often interplanted with 
either a pulse (beans, cowpeas or. grams) or another grain (usually bulrush 
millet) as well as with pigeon peas. On most farms, land is cultivated 
entirely by hand using hoes and digging sticks (worn down panga blades attached 
to wooden handles). Off-farm work provides approximately 40 per cent of1 
4 total household incomes. 
Chayanov, working with a mass of survey data collected from peasant 
farms in late 19th Century.and early 20th Century Russia, developed an 
economic model of the peasant family farm which has yet to be rivalled for 
its comprehensiveness.. His work was published in Russia chiefly in the 1920s. 
In its entirety Chayanov1s model was intended to explain two 
phenomena: the distribution of income between peasant households and the 
Here we are concerned with Chayanov's attempt to explain household resources all 
pattern of resource allocation by individual peasant housholds. / Chayanov c 3 (-
set out to do this by identifying the various determinants of resource allo-
cation on individual peasant farms and the inter-relationship of these 
determinants. Interest in the model revived in western academic circles in 
the 1960s (Thorner, Kerblay and Smith, 1965, and Kerblay in Shanin (ed. );1971). 
3. The East being hotter and drier than the west. 
• Off-farm work includes work for pay on othersv farms. Of this, .. 
however, only a very small proportion is carried out in Mbere, most of such 
income being earned from short-term, migration to the farms of upper Embu, 
on the well-watered slopes of Mount Kenya. 
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Interest centred on the potential usefulness of the model in present-day 
developing countries. Neo-Marxist critics were quick to point out that 
the model was not acceptable because it failed to take account of (i) the 
full extent of the external relationship of the peasant with the capitalist 
economic system and (ii) the full extent of the constraints upon access 
to land which affect large numbers of peasant farmers. As a consequence 
of (i) Chayanov neglected the influence of the outside world in generating 
economic differentiation amongst the peasantry and related phenomena of 
marginalisation, unemployment and proletarianisation of the peasantry. 
Chayanov noted the fact that his model would require modification 
in a context where there were limitations on access to land observing that 
in such cases "the relationship between land and family is regulated by a 
change in the amount of labour hired or hired out" (Chayanov in Thorner, 
Kerblay and Smith, 1965, p. 112). He also noted, as indicated below, various 
aspects of the relationship of peasant producers with the capitalist system, 
but it is nonetheless true that he tended to play these phenomena down in 
focussing his attention on the pure family farm, employing no wage labou"1. 
It should be noted, however, that this weakness in the model does 
not invalidate Chayanov's analysis of the determinants of resource allocation 
on individual peasant farms. This analysis itself is of considerable potential 
importance to the administrators of agricultural development programs in 
peasant economies, for it is only on the basis of a full understanding of 
determinants of peasant resource allocation that effective innovations can 
successfully be introduced in peasant economies. It is upon this aspect of 
Chayanov's model that we focus in.the following discussion. 
Chayanov emphasised that peasant household income is derived from 
both farm and non-farm sources. However he developed his model primarily 
in terms of farm resource allocation. 
His starting premise was that peasant economic life is usually 
based upon a non-wage family economic unit: "most peasant-farms in Russia 
China, India, and in most non-European and even many European states are 
5 unacquainted with the categories of wage labour and wages. 
It followed that whereas the key to understanding economic life in 
capitalist society was to grasp the basis for calculating economic profit-
ability the same profit motive and profitability calculation could not be 
adopted and applied by a non-wage family economic unit. In capitalist society 
an enterprise is considered profitable if its gross income G1 after deductuion 
5. A.V. Chayanov, "On the Theory of Non-Capitalist Systems" in Thorner 
Kerblay and Smith, op.-cit. p. 1. 
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of the circulating capital advanced (i.e., the annual material expenditure 
ME, and the wage cost W) makes a si ;» S,5 which is at least as large as the^ 
whole of the (constant ana circulating) capital, C, at interest, a, calculated 
according to the rate currently prevailing. 
i.e. G1 - (ME + W) ^ C (G) > 100 
Peasant households use family labour and not wage labour. Because 
labour is not paid a fixed wage,, Chayanov argued that its value cannot be 
determined, and because the cost of., labour cannot be determined the profits 
generated by different enterprises cannot be measured. For these reasons 
the key to understanding peasant economic hehaviour must be sought elsewhere, 
peasant household economic behaviour Chayanov identified the composit.ion of 
In seeking an alternative explanation of/the farm family as the "crucial 
characteristic of the peasant farm, governing both its objectives and 
its productive .capacity. Thus he stated: 
"Whichever factor determining peasant farm organization we were to 
consider dominant, however much significance we were to attach to 
the influence of the market amount of land for use or avai 
ability of means of production and natural fertility, we ought 
to acknowledge that work hands are'the technically organizing 
element of any production rpocess„ And since, on. the family farm 
which has no recourse to hired labor, the labor force pool, its 
composition and degree of labor activity are entirely determined 
by family composition and size, we must accept family make-up as 
one of the chief factors in peasant farm organization."^ 
Chayanov saw the family cycle as a key determinant of the objectives, 
productive capacity and economic performance of the household. The peasant 
household has a life cycle in the course of which the ratio of producers 
to dependents in the household changes. For Chayanov the cycle starts when 
a young man and his wife establish their first independent household. The 
second stage is characterised by an upward trend in the number of dependants 
which the household must support as children are born to the family. The 
third phase witnesses a growth in the number of producers and a decline in 
number of dependants as the children move into early adulthood. The fourth 
stage witnesses a decline in the number of producers as the children marry 
and leave home to establish their own households. Finally the parents them-
selves begin to lose their productive capacity. At this stage they may either 
continue to operate an independent household or may become increasingly 
dependant members of the household of one of their children. 
6. 
7. 
p. 53. 
Chayanov, ibid., p. 3, 
Chayanov, '"Peasant Farm Organization", in Thorner et.al., op. cit., 
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Chayanov argued that the absolute number of household members 
(consumers and dependants), their age and sex and the traditional standard 
of living of the community in which they live are the dominant determinants 
of the minimum total output that a household must produce. Secondly, he 
claimed that the ratio of producers to dependants is an important determinant 
of the minimum amount of labour time that must be expended by each of the 
producers in order to produce the Socially acceptable minimum output for 
the household as a whole. This necesary minimum amount of labour is, 
however, also effected by other variables including the agricultural 
potential of a given the relative prices of outputs, inputs and consumer 
goods, and the stock of capital equipment owned by the household. As well 
as these variables the absolute number of producers in the household is also 
important for "this gives the chance of applying the principles of complex 
cooperation in work and thus, increases the power of each."^ 
Chayanov claimed that the minimum acceptable return to labour in 
peasant households varies between households. This conclusion follows 
directly from his analysis of the influence of household composition upon 
the total labour input (drudgery) tolerated by each productive member of 
the household. If we consider two households which are endowed with equal 
amounts of land and capital, one having a producer dependant ratio of 2:1 
and the other of 2:4, we may expect to find lower total labour inputs per 
worker and hence a higher marginal return per hour worked for the first 
household than the second. Implicit in this argument is the normal assumption 
of diminishing marginal returns to labour1, all other factors being held 
constant. 
"Each new ruble of the growing family labor product can be regarded 
from two angles: first, from its significance for consumption, for the 
satiation of family needs, second, from the point of view of the drudgery 
that earned it. It is obvious that with the increase in produce obtained 
by hard work the subjective valuation of each newly gained ruble's signi-
ficance for consumption decreases; but the drudgery of working for it, which 
will demand an ever greater amount of self-exploitation, will increase. As 
long as the equilibrium is not reached between the two elements being 
evaluated (i.e., the drudgery of the work is subjectively estimated as lower 
8. Ibid., p. 60. Chayanov continues: "Thus, every family, depending 
on its age, is in its different phases of development a completely distinct 
labour machine as regards labor force, intensity of demand, consumer-worker 
ratio, and the possibility of applying the principles of complex cooperation.1' 
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than the significance of the needs for whose satisfaction the labour is 
endured), the family, working without paid labour, has every cause to 
continue its economic activity. As soon as this equilibrium point is 
reached, however, continuing to work becomes pointless, as any further labour 
expenditure becomes harder for the peasant or artisan to endure than is 
! 1 
foregoing its economic effects." 
Chayanov stated that 
"If in the farm's estimation the basic equilibrium has not yet been the 
reached, then unsatisfied demands are still quite sharp, and/family running 
the farm is under a very strong pressure to expand its work and to seek 
outlets for its labor while accepting a low level of payment. 'Due to 
necessity', the peasant initiates:what are, at first sight the most disadvant-
ageous undertakings. 
"Conversely, if the basic equilibrium is completely met in the 
farm's esti-mation, only very high labor payment will stimulate the peasant 
a 
to new work. Thus, the marginal (lowest of. those allowed) payment of/labour 
unit depends on the farm's general equilibrium and cannot be objectively 
determined a priori from outside .... 
'•..'.. let us introduce an example to make things clear. Let us 
suppose that a desyatina of oats gives, excluding.seed, a harvest of 60-puds-
the price of oats is 1 ruble a pud, the gross income is 60 rubles, outlays, 
on materials for the crop 20 rubles', the number of working days necessary is 
25, wages are 1 ruble. Then the elements of the calculation will-be: 
For a Capitalist Farm 
Gross income 60 x 1 ruble = 60 rubles 
Expenditure: 
Outlays on materials 20 
Wages 25 
Net income .. .. .. 15 
For a Family Farm 
Gross income 60 x 1 ruble = 60 rubles 
Expenditure: 
Outlays on materials 20 
Obtained for labor payment 40 rubles 
40 Payment per working day x = — = 1.60 rubles 
9. Chayanov, "On the Theory of Non-Capitalis't Economic Systems" in 
Thorner, et. al., op. cit., p. 6. 
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"For the capitalist farm, the crop is evidently advantageous; for the 
peasant farm, it is advantageous if the consumer budget may not be met by 
other uses of labor that give a payment for the working day higher than 1.60 
rubles. 
"Let us now suppose that the price of oats fell to 60 kopeks a pud. 
For a Capitalist Farm 
Gross income 60 x 0.6 ruble = 36 rubles 
Expenditure: 
Outlays on materials 
Wages 
Loss 
For a Family Farm 
Gross income 60 x 0.60 
Expenditure: 
Outlays on materials 
Obtained for labor payment 
Payment per working day 
20 
25 
9 rubles 
= 36 rubles 
20 
16 
0.64 rubles 
"As is seen from the table, the capitalist farm would have a net 
loss of 9 rubles a desyatina, and the cultivation of oats would become 
absolutely disadvantageous to it. For the peasant farm, however, labor 
payment would fall to 64 kopeks, and this figure would be completely accept-
able if the basic economic equilibrium could not be met by directing its 
labor to occupations that gave a higher payment.1 ' 
While this return might be acceptable for one peasant household, for another 
it might not be. 
Chayanov anticipated that in a given production environment with 
a given soil, climate and market conditions, et cetera, income per capita 
would tend to be higher the higher the producer:consumer ratio of the household. 
In a family with'a low producer:consumer ratio the work-force would be compelled 
to work harder and longer hours in order to achieve the desired minimum output 
per capita. Thus the lower the producer:consumer ratio the less the likelihood 
that the minimum output per capita could be exceeded due to the increasing 
marginal disutility of labour. Furthermore the higher the household's income 
per capita, the higher would be the household's propensity to save and to 
accumulate productive capital, which in turn would raise the output per 
workhour. 
10. Chayanov, op. cit., pp. 87 and 88. 
Source: Chayanov, "Peasant Farm Organization", in Thorner 
et al. , op. cit., pp. 61 and 63. 
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In order to test empirically the validity of his thesis Chayanov 
relied most heavily on the use of total cultivated area per household as 
an index of total family economic activity. He argued that the relationship 
between family development and farm size would vary between different areas, 
depending on variations in the form of genera], economic life, but that it 
would tend to be constant within a given area. For three areas Chayanov 
presented the results reproduced in Diagram 1. While this diagram tells us 
nothing about the determinants of output per capita it does present 
empirical data from Russian rural communities which demonstrates the 
positive relationship that one might reasonably predict between the peasant 
farm and family size in all areas where there is sufficient land availalable 
and where if there is private ownership of land, there is a sufficiently 
flexible market in it to permit such size adjustments. 
Chayanov continues, however, 
"We ought to stress that at any particular moment the family 
is not the sole determinant of the size of a particular farm 
and determines its size only .in a general way. The comparatively 
high correlation coefficients (0.4 to 0.65) established between 
these figures are, nevertheless, far from 1.00. This alone 
indicates the existence of parallel factors which in turn exert 
pressure on the figure being studied. 
"In studying the road along which the peasant farm develops, we 
ought to notice that to convert the number of family working hands 
into .farm size and income we must additionally determine : to what 
extent these hands may be utilized; what part of potential 
working time is actually expended; what is the intensity of their 
labor or its degree of self-exploitation; what are the available 
technical means of production with which labor enters the production 
process; how high, in the final result will be the productivity of 
this labor, depending on natural conditions and the market situ~ 
,,11 
ation." 
With regard to the total labour' energy expended Chayanov found that 
"peasants spend a comparatively small proportion of their labor— 
in all, only 25-40 per cent - on agriculture in the areas we have studi 
Even if we add to this all work in crafts and trades, we still have 
to recognize that peasant labor is far from fully used and gives a 12 use rate not exceeding 50 per cent. 
11. Chayanov, "Peasant Farm Organization", op. cit. p. 69. 
12. Chayanov derived these figures by relating hours worked to hours 
spent awake I 
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"The main reason for this undoubtedly lies in the particular 
features of labor organization in agriculture. In contrast to 
the processing industry, in which labor processes are not 
connected with any time of the day or year, a great part of the 
agricultural process is exclusively seasonal in nature, and some 
demands particularly favourable weather conditions which are not 
always present .... 
"We must add that in different farm periods there are sharp changes 
not only in the number of working days but also in the intensity 
.13 of each day's work." 
Since the stock of capital per worker was also seen as an important 
determinant of total output per worker, Chayanov was concerned to explain 
the forces determining capital accumulation on peasant farms. He observed 
that on peasant farms gross income must be divided between meeting (i) 
consumption needs, (ii) capital renewal (including both working capital 
and maintenance and occasional renewal of fixed capital), and (iii) capital 
augmentation. 
In Novgorod guberniya Chayanov observed that as its well-being grew 
the peasant farm increased its capital intensity more and more until it 
reached a level of about 80 rubles economic expenditure per consumer. 
After this, the advances for capital formation increased no further, but 
fluctuated about this sum. (See Diagram 2). Chayanov states: 
"This observation has recently been made by other economists 
as well as by us; it permits us to suppose that in peasant farm 
organization there exists a certain limit to national equipping 
of the work force with means of production. Any increase in 
capital available to the worker up to this limit obviously helps 
to raise labor productivity. At this limit, the maximum is 
reached and the available capital enables the work force to develop 
its full production potential. No further increase in the farm's 
capital intensity (unless accompanied by a change in technique, of 
course) can increase labor productivity and alter the basic 
equilibrium of on-farm factors .... 
"We see that at a low level of personal budget the process of 
capital formation, or even only of capital renewal, cannot take 
place to any considerable extent. So far are elementary needs 
from being satisfied that there can be no thought of limiting 

13 IDS/WP 276 
consumption and devoting any considerable amount to capital 
formation. Only gradually, as labor productivity increases and 
the personal budget can be expended to meet 
chief family needs one after another, is the head of the farm 
able to direct an ever-increasing part of income to capital renewal 
and formation. In other words, we can say that on the family farm 
advances to renew and to form capital carried out from the same 
budget are linked to the process of satisfying personal demands, 
and in every case their amount depends on the degree to which 
these demands are satisfied. 
Thus capital accumulation on the peasant farm may be contrasted 
with the same process in a capitalist undertaking. In the capitalist case 
"We see that the capital advanced is invested, in elements of product, 
(land, equipment, labor and so on); when these have gone through 
the production cycle they are sold for money and give gross income. 
From gross income, first, the advanced capital is, renewed; then, 
all that remains is the undertaking's net profit. The profit.is 
H | 1 the farm's target . ... 
Chayanov observed diminishing returns to both land and capital, 
other factors being held constent. 
As stated earlier, Chayanov observed that the peasant household 
usually engages in crafts and trades as well as farming. He found that in 
different areas the average amount of time devoted to farming and to these 
other activities varied, and argued that these variations were a function 
of variations in the relative return to labour in farming and off-farm income 
earning activities in different areas. Table 1 illustrates this variation 
in time allocation with data from three guberniyas. 
Chayanov did not believe that the family, farm sector should be 
viewed as a totally self-contained unit, completely separate from other sectorr 
of the national economy. Rather, he held that 
"Great family farm sectors of the national economy, 
in general always passive, are drawn into the capitalist 
system of the economy and subordinated to the- organizing 
centers of capitalism. They themselves then begin to influence 
these centers with the peculiar features of their economic behaviour. 
14. 
16. 
15. 
Chayanov, op. cit., pp. 201 and 202. 
Chayanov, op. cit, p. 197, 
Chayanov, op. cit. p. 225. 
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Table 1 
Agri- Crafts 
culture & 
Trades 
Total House Unused 
Prod- Work Time 
uctive 
Labor 
Festi- Total 
vals 
Vologda Uezd, 
Vologda Guberniya 
Volokolamsk Uezd 
Moscow Guberniya 
Starobel'sk Uezd, 
Khar'kov Guberniya 
24. 7 
28.6 
23.6 
18.1 
fi.2 
4.4 
42.8 4.4 
36.8 
28.0 
33.;: 
43.2 
3.0 42.0 
19.8 100.0 
20.0 100.0 
27.0 100.0 
Source: Chayanov, op. cit., p. 74, 
Chayanov's model is significant not only for the light which it 
throws upon the determination of resource allocation and household incomes 
in a peasant economy, but for the predictions which the model makes regarding 
the peasant household's response to changes in the value of exogenously 
determined variables which influence the household's resource allocation 
decisions. These variables include the prices of outputs and inputs, the 
quality of agricultural land and population 'density. 
We will illustrate this using Chayanov's own example with respect 
to the rent of agricultural land. Chayanov argued that the peasant household's 
response to changes in the valuables just mentioned is ultimately mani-
fested in changes in the values of the only four general economic realities 
in the peasant farm system. These are (i) the farm's gross income, (ii) sums 
spent from it on capital renewal, (iii) the family personal budget, and 
(iv) savings not invested in the farmer's own farm. 
Chayanov maintained that it is impossible to impute rent to peasant 
farm land since there is no wage category objectively given. Secondly, where 
peasants hire land both the determinants of the price which they are 
prepared to pay and the level of the price paid differ from those on capitalist 
farms. He continued: 
"To construct a theory of economic rent elements on the labor 
farm, it seems to us necessary to trace the effect on it to the 
usual rent-forming factors that create and quantitatively determine 
the differential rent of capitalist agriculture. It is clear that 
for the peasant farm both better quality of fields and more 
favourable situation of the farm as regards the market leads either 
to a fall in material expenditure and labor effort to obtain the 
same gross income, or to a rise in this income given the same expendi-
ture and labor effort. 
- 15 
"In both cases , this will mean for the labor farm an increased 
payment per labor unit in more favourable conditions as regards 
economic rent. It will lead to establishing a new equilibrium 
17 between drudgery of labor and demand satisfaction. 
The consequences of a shift to better quality land are an increase 
in the peasant household's consumption level, a lowering of labour intensity 
and an increase in the farm's power to form capital. 
Chayanov concluded: 
"It is clear that the peasant labor farm will consider worthwhile 
the rent paid for any plot of land that enables it to achieve 
its internal balance at a more favourable point of equilibrium 
between drudgery of labor and demand satisfaction than it 
would have without it. To do this, it is necessary that other 
than the deduction for rent the labor used on the rented land 
should receive from income a payment higher than the marginal 
payment obtainable if the equilibrium of on-farm factors were 
established without the rent payment .... 
"In accordance with this, in areas where there is a vast amount 
of land, where net labor payment on peasant farms is no lower than 
wages, and where farms operate at optimal intensity, the peasant 
farm will, if it has to pay rent, pay no more than capitalist farms, 
18 
and more probably will take land only at lower amounts. In over 
populated areas, however, in order to establish its internal equil-
ibrium the peasant farm is obliged to force up intensification far 
above the optimum. 
Where payment per labor unit in the peasant farm's usual sectors 
is lower than the capitalist farm's wages, the peasant farm 
will consider it worthwhile to pay a much higher rent than the 
capitalist rent. This will leave it a labor ^ payment below farm 
wages. Nevertheless, given a severe pressure on the land, these 
'hunger rents' .... can improve the peasant farm's internal pqui l.ih-niutc 
point .... 
17. Chayanov, op. cit. p. 230 
18. It has been suggested that this statement cannot hold in conditions 
of a competitive land market. One possible explanation is that Chayanov meant 
that peasants would probably only be willing to take up additional land at a 
lower price, since, assuming capitalists and peasants farm land, of the same 
quality, in a competitive market only one price could prevail. A more probable 
explanation derives, from the fact that peasants and capitalist farmers operated 
very different sized hoV-V'-s, and in such circumstances peasants may be interested 
in leasing in from capitalist farmers for varying periods pokkets of land which the 
latter do not wish to use. 
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"This brings us to a paradoxical conclusion: in overpopulated 
areas, the poorest peasant families will pay the highest prices 
19 for land and in rent. 
The consequences for the peasant household of a change in land rent 
are analogous to those that derive from changes in other exogenous variables 
such as the quality of farm machines, the prices of inputs and outputs and 
the price of capital. 
One other apparent paradox in the behaviour of peasant economic 
systems should also be mentioned. In Chayanov's words: 
"We may theoretically assert that peasant family division of labor 
between earnings from agriculture and from crafts and trades is 
achieved by a comparison of the market situation in these two 
branches of the national economy. And since the relationship 
between these two market situations is inconstant, the relationship 
between labor expenditure on crafts and trades and on agriculture 
also inconstant» In years of an unfavourable agricultural market 
situation - for example, given a harvest failure - the impossibility 
of attaining the economic equilibrium with the help of general 
agricultural occupations obliges the peasants to cast onto the 
labor market a huge quantity of peasant working hands who look for' 
a livelihood from crafts and trades. As a result, we have the 
situation - normal for Russia, but paradoxical from a Western 
viewpoint - in which periods of high grain prices are, at the same 
20 time, periods of low wages. 
Let us now turn to consider whether the Chayanov model is applicable 
in the Mbere context. Since the model starts from the assumption of a non-
wage economic unit, the first question that we must ask is whether such units 
are a dominant feature of the Mbere economy. To this the answer lies in the 
affirmative. Only a very small minority of Mbere households employ farm labour 
on a permanent basis. The great majority employ either no labour at all or a 
little casual labour at peak seasons, this latter constituting a very small . 
proportion of the total labour input. Of fifty-two households taken into a 
twelve month case-study in 1972/3' five employed permanent labour; three young 
girls as maids, two young boys as herdsboys and one adult farm-hand; and a 
19- Chayanov, op. cit., pp. 234 and 235. 
20. Chayanov, op. cit. p. 109, 
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random sample survey .of 205 households throughout the division revealed that 
five per cent of all households employed permanent labour. 
Chayanov concluded that for non-wage economic units there could be 
no objective measurement—o-f- -labottr costs and--herrce"no' measurement of" pro Fits. 
Our next question must therefore be: do these conclusions also hold in Mbere? 
It may seem strange to ask this question at all, since if certain conclusions 
follow from a given premise in one context, they might also be expccted to 
do so in any other context in which the conditions of the first premise are 
met. However, it is logically possible that the same conclusions might not 
hold in Mbere. This would be the case if it were possible in Mbere to measure 
objectively the marginal returns to labour in the range df different uses in 
which it is normally employed in this area and if it were found both that the 
mean return in different uses was constant and that the variation about the 
mean was low. Such conditions would differ . markedly from those observed 
by Chayanov, for it was the variation in the observed marginal return to on-farm 
labour between households that impressed him and which is, of course, an 
essential feature of his model. — -
• In..Mbere we observed two phenomena. Firstly, there also is a very 
wide variation in returns to labour. These are illustrated in Table 2. 
Secondly, there appears in Mbere to be a notable tendency for the average 
return to labour in different activities such as crop production, livestock 
production and part-time off-farm income-earning activities to tend towards 
shs.-/M-0 per hour, which is itself equal to the normal rate of pay of causal 
21 
farm labour in the area and in neighbouring Upper Embu. since "the data on 
which this statement is based derive from a small number of case-study house-
holds ."we"cannot claim that this impression is definitely correct. Assuming, 
however, that it is correct does this finding mean that in Mbere we must 
modify Chayanov's conclusion concerning the impossibility of measuring profit 
on predominantly non-wage economic units? The answer is no: Chayanov's con-
clusion stands. Even if the mean is constant the conclusion stands due to the 
very high observed variations about the mean. For these variations signify 
that the objective returns to labour vary widely between households. Hence the 
use of a single figure to value all labour costs would mean that we would 
find all ..households with returns to labour belo" • the mean operating at 
loss, which once again generates the apparently nonsensical result that many 
huuseholds remain in business year after year when they are apparently earnin 
a. negative profit. 
It was precisely this wide•variation in the.returns to labour in • 11 • , V ( 
peasant communities which led Chayanov to develop his theory of peasant 
21. Whither many Mbere migrate termporarily m search of farm-work 
following a crop-failure in their own area. 
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Table 2 
A Returns/Hour to Labour Used in Crop Production' ' 
Farm No. 1st (Short Rains) Season Both Seasons 
Taken Together 
1 -/50 -/44 
2 -/52 -/47 
3 -/89 -/82 
4 -/36 - /29 
5 -/57 ~/57 
(6 -/32 -/29 
(6 -/66 (adult labour only) 
7 -/43 -/37 
8 -/32 -/30 
9 -/24 -/22 
11 -/24 
-/44 -/40 
20 1/07 -/77 
17 -/54 -/42 
19 -/52 -/41 
22 -/85 -/67 
21 -/94 -/76 
23 -/55 -/42 (?) 
-/75 -/52 
28 -/35 -/25 
29 -/53 -/39 
30 -/20/ -/12 
31 -/40 -/27 
32 -/24 -/19 
(33 -/31 -/13 
(33 -/42 (adult labour only) 
34 -/20 -/14 
-/32 -/21 
(1) Figures are given for all households taken into the case-stydy for 
which on the basis of twelve months' daily records of labour use plus 
comprehensive crop yield estimates complete estimates of returns to labour 
are available. 
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Returns Hour to Livestock Production 
Herd Herd Adult Child Total Value - -Return per 
Farm Size Size Labour Labour of Production Hour 
[Jo. (Oct (Oct Hours Hours Prior to Net of Total 
1972) 1972) Over 12 Over Deduction Hired Adult Labour 
Cattle Sheep Months 12 months to Labour Labour Labour 
& F=Family Costs Only 
Goats H=Hired 
2 1 9 106 3155(F) 443/ = 443/ = 4/18 - /14 
3 0 13 569 1184(F) 332/ = 332/= -/58 -/19 
6 11 5 140 2900(H) 580/ = 388/ = 2/77 -/20 
7 . 0 12 155 623 223/ = 223/ = 1/44 -/29 
14 0 1 208 0 100/= .100/ = -/48 -/48 
16 0 4 73 276(F) 250/ = 250/ = 3/42 -/72 
20 0 4 46 3 281(F) 118/= 118/ = -/25 -/16 
9 8 3 572 0 420/ = 420/ = - /73 . -/73 
28- 0 8 1081 0 1752/= 1752/= 1/62 1/62 
29.;. 0 11 1158 1447(F) 1400/= 1400/= 1/21 - /54 
30 10 19 3101 0 592/ = 592/ = -/20 -/20 
Mean 1/54 -/46 
"Received dowry during year 
C Returns Hour to Off-farm Income-earning Activi ties Engaged • in by Mbere 
Adults Without Full-time Off-farm Employment 
.Activity 
Livestock trading 
Maintaining beehives 
Making and selling charcoal 
Cutting and selling sisal 
Working in quarry 
House-building 
Working sugar cane press at a bar 
Working on SRDP water trench 
Tailoring 
Farm Lbouring in Upper Enibu or 
Mbere 
Making and selling beer 
Crop trading 
men only 
>i ii 
men and women 
i ? K 
women only 
Return/hour-
0 up to I/ = 
0 up to 2/ = 
~/31 - ~/80 
Mean = ~/55 
-/71 
"/75 
- / 8 0 
~/95 
1/-
1/20 
~/40 
-/46 
0 UD to 1/-
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Activity Ret urn/Hour1'1 
Selling mandasi and gruel Woman only -/26 -/76 
Collecting and selling firewood ." " -/25 
Collecting and selling thatching grass " " -/21 
Making and selling sisal strings . .. •-™/18 
AWhere one figure only is given this represents an average for all observation'. 
economy with its emphasis upon the importance of family size and the producer: 
consumer ratio as determinants of variations in returns to labour within 
a given area. 
As pointed out earlier, Chayanov held that variations in family 
size were closely associated with variations in sown area on the family 
farm, and that variations in the producer:consumer ratio of different house-
holds were closely associated with variations in hours worked per producer. 
We have therefore three dependant variables (size of cultivated area, hours 
worked per producer and per capita income) all of which Chayanov claimed 
are influenced by the demographic make-up of the...family . (in terms of-family 
size and the producer:dependant ratio). Let us now turn to consider whether 
in Mbere also family size and the producer:dependeant ratio are closely 
associated with, these dependant variables. 
Table 3 and Diagram 3 relate family size (in standardised 
consumption units) to cultivated area for 38 case-study households.- They 
reveal a marked tendency for both variables to increase in size together. 
A rank correlation test confirmed the strong positive association beteen 
the two, being significant at the 0,01 (l per cent) level. 
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Table 4 presents data relating hours worked per adult per annum 
to the household produce:consumer ratio, In this case Ohayanov hypothesised 
an inverse correlation between the two variables. The- case-study data 
also support this hypothesis. For the 29 households for whom the data were 
available the rank correlation coefficient is again significant at the 
0.01 level. 
It is when we turn to examine the relationship between the producer: 
consumer (P:C) ratio and per capita income that we find the Chayanov model 
ceases to hold in the Mbere context. For the 23 Mbere households for 
whom comprehensive income estimates were made there is no correlation at 
411 between the P:C ratio and per capita income (see Table 5). The main 
explanation for this lies in a phenomenon which Chayanov did not consider: 
the variation in the formal educational attainment of the household heads. 
This phenomenon was obviously of little importance in determining income 
distribution amongst peasant households -in pre-revolution Russia. In Kenya, 
however, ever since the early decades of this centru experience of formal 
education has been generally the sine qua non for access to better payin 
jobs. Since Independence in 1963 there has been a massive expansion of 
the educational sector., of which one of the most notable features has 
been the expansion of primary education in rural areas. 
IN the final column of Table 5 we have listed the educational 
attainment of the heads of the 23 households whose per capita incomes are 
listed in the table. Although one or two households go against the 
trend (particularly household number 6, which has a high per capita income 
although the household head has had no formal education) even this small 
group of households reveals a market contrast between the mean income of 
those households where the head has received some formal education 
(Shs 604/=) and those where the head had received no education (Shs 398/=). 
Data obtained from the random sample survey confirm this distinction 
Multiple regression analysis revealed that education alone explains 19. 
per cent of the variation in wealth between households in Mbere. 
Chayanov also claimed that for a 'given area and a given producer: 
consumer ratio households with a relatively large number of- productive 
members.would achieve a relatively high value of output per productive 
member due to exploitation of economies of scale in allocating labour 
time,.; This hypothesis cannot be reliably tested against the case-study 
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data since the total number of households for which comprehensive 
income data is available is too sm^ll for it to be possible to meaning-
ful subdivide them into groups with different P:C ratios. However, given 
the importance which we have already found attaches to formal education 
in the determination of differences in ner capita income, we would be 
unlikely to find that the number of producers exerts a very noticeable 
influence upon per capita output for households with a given P:C ratio. 
The limited data that was obtained from the case-study house-
holds which is relevant to the testing of this hypothesis is listed in 
Table 6. From the table we can see that there is certainly no market 
trend apparent of the kind Chavanoy refers to. The ten households where 
the head had received no education neither consistently confirm nor 
refute the hypothesis - clearly a much larger sample is needed in order 
to reach a clear conclusion. For there is one reason for supposing 
that there is some scope for obtaining economies of scale in labour use. 
This lies in the nature of the task which we have classified as housework. 
For most of these, such as fetching water and firewood, the amount of 
time required for their completion may increase as household size increases 
but at a slower rate than the rate of increase of household size. Thus 
it is certainly possible that where both the P:C ratio and education 
are held cc istant there might be sc \ie increase in out, ut per producer 
(or in leisure time per producer) as the number of productive members 
of the household increases. Compares with the potential influence of 
education on per capita .income, however, we may expect the potential 
impact of economies of scale in .labour use to be snail, for there appears 
to be relatively little scope for the exploitation of economies of 
scale in what we have classified as actual productive activities in Mbere 
(which exclude housework). Thus the impact of such.economies of scale 
on total output or lessure time must derive predominantly from the impact 
of labour ''released-1 from housework. 
Chayanov held that in a peasant household production takes place 
not up to the point where the objectively measurable marginal cost equals 
marginal revenue but to the point where the marginal utility of output-
equals the marginal disutility of work. This statement cannot be submitted 
to any sort of objective test. All that we can say is that in Mbere it 
appears to describe accurately the basis upon which labour is allocated to 
farming and to casual off-farm income earning activities (i.e. those off-
farm income earning activities that are not undertaken on a regular basis 
working more or less fixed hours.) For the small minority with regular 
eluding absent household head 
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Table 5 
Producer:Consumer Ratio and Per Capita Income for 23 Case-Study Households 
Farm 
Number 
Total 
Income 
(Shs) 
3 4 
No. of Income 
Consumer per 
Equivalent Consumer 
Equivalent 
Rank 
P:C 
(incl. 
absent 
males) 
P:C 
Rank 
Educ. of 
House-
hold 
Head 
1 1262. 0 4.0 
2 1351. 0 4.25 
3 2488. 0 3.25 
4 531. 0 3 
5 5463. 0 6.25 
6 3473. 0 3.5 
7 1405 3.25 
8 864 3.5 
9 679 1.5 
12 1730 5.25 
14 2250 2.5 
16 2200 3.5 
17 2070 2.75 
.18 2104 3.5 
19 900 3.0 
20 1204 3.5 
21 1155 3.2 5 
22 846 2.25 
28 1955 4. 75 
29 4.5 
30 1427 3.0 
31 522 1.75 
32 736 1.75 
39 4500 4.25 
315.5 
317.9 
765.5 
177.0 
874.1 
992.3 
432.3 
246.9 
435.0 
330.0 
900.0 
639.0 
752.7 
601. 1 
300.0 
344.0 
355.4 
376.0 
411.6 
479.0 
298.3 
420.6 
105 8.8 
5 1 17 Pl-4 
6 0 .51 3 0 
19 0 . 77 12 Pl-4 
1 0 .47 2 0 
20 0 .67 8 P5-end 
22 0 .57 4 0 
13 0 .62 6 0 
2 0 .77 ?3 0 
14 1 .0 18 0 
7 0 .46 1 0 
21 0, .88 14 Pl-4 
17 0, .57 5 Pl-4 
18 0, .73 10 S3-4 
16 1, . 14 20 Pl-4 
4 1 19 0 
8 0. , 69 9 Pl-4 
9 0, .74 11 0 
10 0. 89 15 0 
11 0. ,95 16 Pl-4 
15 1, .23 23 
3 1. ,14 21 
12 1. 14 22 
23 0.64 
Pl-4 
P5-end 
P5-end i 
mecho.n.i 
training 
S3-4 
Note 1: Persons aged 12-59 equal 1 consumer equivalent each; those aged 
60+ and children aged 3-11 equal one half consumer equivalent each: 
babies equal one quarter. 
Note 2: In column 8 the educational attainment of the household head is 
listed by specified ranges of years of schooling and not by the 
exact number of years of school received. 
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off-farm work who are earning regular pay Chayanov's statement presumably 
often does not hold. For an important cost of possessing a regular job 
is the loss of the worker's freedom to determine the number of hours 
he or she works each day. Evidence to support our presumption that 
Chayanov'.s statement is correct with regard to the first group of income-
earning activities mentioned lies in the fact that households do indeed 
accept varying marginal returns to work. We may suggest that the readiness 
of some households to accept relatively low returns derives partly from such 
factors as (a) ignorance of potential returns that might be obtained and 
(b) the psychic satisfaction that may derive from the visits and commendation 
of the extension service and of the "important visitors1' that they may 
sometimes bring with them, as well as from such important factors as the 
variation in produce:dependant ratios, in the absolute number of producers 
per household, and in the stock of farm Capital. But acceptance of the 
influence of all these variables in determining per capita output in no 
way alters the. fundamental fact that some people work much longer hours 
than others even when the objectively valued marginal return to their labour 
is notably low. This can only be explained in terms of variations in the 
subjective valuat ion of the utility of output and the disutility of labour. 
As stated earlier, Chayanov also observed that on peasant farms 
gross income must be divided between meeting (i) consumption needs, (ii) 
capital renewal and (iii) capital augmentation. He claimed that as its 
well-being grows the peasant farm increases its capital intensity up to a 
certain equilibrium level beyond which point he implies that the marginal 
cost of further cspitrs. 1 accumulation would exceed the marginal return. 
We have some data obtained from the case-study households which 
enables us to consider whether Chayanov's observation holds also in Mbere. 
Certainly one would expect the allocation of resources to capital renewal 
and accumulate to increase as gross income per capita rises. In Table 7 
we examine this hypothesis. Columns 2 and 6 in this table list the total 
cash outlays on farming by 23 case-study households during 1972-73. Columns 
2 - 4 refer to working capital and columns 5 and 6 refer to fixed capital. 
The rank correlation coefficient for total capital outlays and total capita 
income is significant at the 0.05 level. Thus, although some households 
are ranked very differently in columns 8 and 10 (especially farms numbers 
2, 3, 12 and 17) the data do reveal a general tendency for those with the 
highest total per capital income to spend most on farm working capital and 
capital accumulation. 
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Output per Producer Related to the Number 
Producers in Each Household 
IDS/WP 276 
of 
P:C 
Ratio 
1 
0.51 
0.77 
0.47 
0.67 
0.57 
0.62 
0.77 
1.0 
0.46 
0.88 
0.57 
0.73 
1.14 
1 
0.69 
0.74 
0.89 
0.95 
1.23 
1.14 
1.14 
0.64 
Rank Total Income 
(Shs) 
No. of 
Producers 
17 1262-00 4 
3 1351-00 2 .16 
12 2488-00 2 .5 
2, 531-00 1 .41 
8 5463-00 4 .2 
4 3473-00 2 .0 
6 1405-00 2 .0 
13 864-00 2 .4 
18 679-00 1 .5 
1 1730-00 3 . 8 
14 2250-00 2 .2 
5 2200-00 2 .0 
10 2070-00 2 .0 
20 2104-00 3 .0 
19 900-00 2 .0 
9 1204-00 1 .4 
11 1155tOO 2 . 4 
15 846-00 2 .0 
16 1955-00 4 .5 
23 1437-00 2 .65 
21 522-00 1 .00 
22 736-00 1, .00 
7 4500-00 1, .70 
Rank Value of Output 
per Pro-
ducer 
21 315.5 
13 628.4 
17 995.2 
3 379.3 
22 1300.7 
7 1736 .5 
8 702.5 
15 360.0 
5 452.7 
20 455.36 
14 1022.7 
9 1100.0 
10 1035.0 
19 701. 3 
11 450. 0 
4 860.0 
16 481. 3 
12 423.0 
23 434.4 
18 542.3 
1 522.0 
2 736.0 
6 2647.1 
Rank 
1 
12 
17 
3 
21 
22 
14 
2 
18 
20 
19 
13 
6 
16 
9 
4 
5 
11 
10 
15 
23 
Household head has received no formal education 
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The seasonality of allocation of labour to farming and the 
seasonal variations in intensity of farm-work both of which were observed 
by Chayanov in Russia were observed to exist in Mbere as they did on 
peasant farms in Russia, and as they have been observed to do in many 
farm systems throughout the world. 
From the case-study records (See Tables 8 and 9) we have 
summarised the allocation of labour time to the two main crop mixtures 
(i.e. those having maize or millet as the dominant grain) over one 
complete good rainfall season. The conflated results do not give very 
specific calendar dates for the various activities performed. This is 
because, due to the uncertainty in the timing of the onset of the rains 
and variability in resource constraints between households, the optimal 
planting date, which determines the optimal timing of the performance of 
subsequent activities, varies between households. Broadly speaking, 
however, the pattern of labour inputs into crop production in a good 
short rains season may be represented as in Diagram 3. 
In Russia Chayanov also noted that the division of labour 
between on-farm and off-farm income earning activities was determined by 
the relative return to the obtained in each. The same also appears to 
apply to Mbere. J.N. , when asked why he neglected his cotton in order 
to give time to charcoal production replied that he earned a better income 
from the latter (which was indeed true) and those who can get regular 
paid employment prefer this to farming. It was noted that whenever men 
do have full-time off-farm work they expect their wives to continue to 
work the land. This makes sound economic sense since housework is not a 
full-time activity. What is perhaps more remarkable is the amount of 
capital that some of these men are prepared to sink into crop-production 
out of their savings from off-farm work. (Farm number 39 is a case in 
point.). The returns to these investments in additional working capital 
are often low or negative due to the failure of the rains. The readiness 
of such people to make these investments can only be explained in terms 
of a desire to pioneer farm innovation in Mbere despite the high risk 
attached to doing so. Although crop production potential is poor in 
Mbere, crop production has become over the past century an important 
component of the Mbere way of life. 
30 I DS/WP 2/6 
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Table 9: Mean Time-Flow of Labour Inputs into Production of Maize Mixtures: Short Rains 1972/73. 
Study Land Crop Clear- Date Plant- Date Weed- Date Scar- Date Harvest- Date Thresh- Date 
ing ing ing ing ing- ing 
1 Hectare Maize 
Mixture 
jsniara 193 85 275 385 127 70 
Kamugu 154 64 724 345 148 64 
Kiritiri 77 66 339 60 142 62 i 
H 
2nd half 
Sept. & 
all Oct. 
8 Dec.-
Feb. 
Overall 
Average 141 July-
Seot. 
72 2nd half 446 1st weed- 263 
Sept. & ing Nov.; 
all Oct. 2nd weed-
ing Dec. 
139 1st half 
Feb. & 
2nd half 
March 
65 when 
needed 
* Does not include transporting crop to homestead or to market. 
32 
Labour 
Sept 
Diagram 3, 
Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Time 
In Mbere some of the better paying casual off-farm jobs exploited 
by farm households are not available of a regular basis. For example? work 
on the construction of the Special Rural Development Program pipeline 
was available for a limited number of months; work cutting sisal for the 
Meka sisal' factory is available only when sisal prices are high enough 
to make it attractive for the sisal factory to operate; and work quarrying 
stones or digging sand from a stream bed is only available when the contract 
wants the work done. Consequently the relative profitability of farming 
compared with the available off-farm work will vary over time for a given 
household depending upon what off-farm work is available. 
Chayanov also observed that in Russia a series of exogenously 
determined variables influence output per capita, and the same also 
applies in Mbere. These variables include population density, the natural 
quality of the land, climate, proximity to markets and the prices of 
inputs and outputs. However, Mbere population density tends to be greatest 
where water availability is most favourable to farming, so that there is 
no significant difference in the average total wealth of households in the 
more and less wall-watered areas. 
Also as in Russia we might expect the family farm, iti Mbere 
necessarily to enter into economic relationships with the broader capitalistic 
economic network which governs economic life in the modern sector of the 
Kenyan economy. We cannot illustrate this for Mbere as we did for 
Chayanov's own model with the example of the impact of changes in the 
rent of agricultural land on household resource allocation because during 
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1972-73 most land in Mbere had not been adjudicated and there was neither 
widespread ownership of freehold title (ultimate disposal of most land 
still being controlled by the clan elders) nor a develped market for 
agricultural land. Also, there was minimal use of purchased agricultural 
inputs except amongst a small minority of relatively wealthy farmers, 
and most farmers produced their output primarily for home consumption, 
selling only the surplus produced in good seasons. 
It is in the market for food-crops and the sale of agricultural 
labour time to the more prosperous farms in Upper Embu that we might 
expect to observe the distinctive relationships of a non-wage family 
economy with the impersonal market system. We do indeed observe that 
farm households in Mbere tend to seal their surplus output in precisely 
those periods of plenty when prices are low. But we must acknowledge that 
this phenomenon can also be observed in other more advanced farm system 
in Europe and U.S.A., and is not in fact peculiar to peasant farm systems. 
With respect to the price of peasant labour, Chayanov observed 
in Russia that in years of an unfavourable agirucltural market situation -
for example, given a harvest failure - the impossibility of attaining 
economic equilibrium with the help of general agricultural occupations 
obliges peasants to cast onto the labour market a huge quantity of 
peasant working hands. Consequently periods of high grain prices are, 
at the same time, periods of low wages. 
It is remarkable that this phenomenon of a wage fall does not 
apparently occur in the Mbere economy. The reasons for this appear to 
be firstly that the Mbere, even in a dry season when they migrate to Upper 
Embu in relatively large numbers to look for work, do not constitute 
a sufficiently large proportion of the farm work-force in surrounding 
areas to exert a marked influence on agricultural wages, and secondly 
hat whenever there is a tendency for money wages to fall, the Mbere 
request payment in kind, usually in the form of speckfied quantities 
of maize. 
That we do not observe the same range of distinctive relation-
ships between the farm family economy of Mbere and the capitalist market 
system as Chayanov observed among peasant communities in Russia derives 
from the fact that for most Mbere households the Mbere economy is as yet 
less fully integrated with a broader1 market economy than • was the case, in 
Russia. 
- 35 
We are now in a position to recapitulate. There follows in Table 
8 a summary of the key features of Chayanov's model together with an 
indication of whether each feature is applicable in the Mbere context. 
Thus we may conclude that in most respects Chananov's model of the 
determinants of peasant farm resource allocation also explains household 
resource allocation in Mbere. The most important modification that we 
need to make in Mbere is that the dominant determinants of variations 
in per capita income in Mbere are experience of formal education and 
access to full-time off-farm work which are in fact closely related. Also, 
twho phenomena which appeared to Chayanov to be of importance in Russia 
are as yet of less significance in Mbere, in one case because the Mbere 
farm economy is technologically less advanced than the peasant farm 
systems observed by Chayanov (feature no. 6) and in the other because 
it is less fully integrated into a wider capitalistic market economy 
than were the communities studied by Chayanov (feature no. 12). 
For purposes of planning the promotion of farm development in areas 
of relatively traditional family farming such as Mbere an understanding 
of the determinants of household resource allocation is of considerable 
importance. This is chiefly because it must be appreciated by planners and 
extension staff that households must be expected to respond differently 
and not uniformly to a given economic opportunity depending upon their 
subjective evaluation of the utility to be derived from it and the 
disutility of allocating resources to it. The smaller the potential 
increase in income (objectively measured) to be derived from a particular 
recommendation the more varied the response of different households to 
it is likely to be. 
Chayanov himself was not so concerned to explain innovation on 
peasant farms as the use of working capital and accumulation of fixed capital 
where both represented the use of already tried techniques. In Mbere 
and other such areas it is important also to explain readiness to innovate. 
In concluding this paper, therefore, we note that as with the use of 
capital, so we may also expect the allocation of all resources - land and 
labour as well as capital - for innovatory purposes to rise as household 
capita income rises. The data to support this additional feature of 
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Table 8 
Feature Relevance in Mbere 
Dominance of the non-wage family 
economic unit 
Due to (1) impossible to calculate profit 
according to capitalist formula. 
For each household family size influences 
the size of the cultivated area. 
For each household the producer:consumer 
ratio influences the hours worked per 
adult. 
For each household the producer:consumer 
ratio determines the value of total 
output per capita 
In a given area the number of producers in 
a household influences the level of output 
per producer. 
For each household production takes place up 
to the point where the marginal utility 
of output is equal to the marginal disutility 
of work. 
For each household as the value of output per 
capita rises the allocation of resources to 
the acquisition of farmworking and overhead 
capital tends to increase. 
There is a seasonal variation in the applica-
tion of labour to farming and in the intensity 
of farm work. 
The farm family also allocates labour to off-
farm work. The extent to which it does so is 
influenced by the relative return to labour 
in different uses. 
Other exogenous variables such as climate, the 
quality of soil, population density also 
influence the value of total farm output. 
The peasant farm economy may be expected to Potentially true but of little 
respond to changes in the values of exogenously relevance as yet in Mbere. 
determined variables such as the price of farm 
outputs and inputs and the price of agricultural 
land in a different manner from that in which the 
capitalist farm responds. 
In Mbere experience of formal 
education and access to full-
time off-farm work are the 
chief determinants of variations 
in per capita income. 
Possible as a result of economic 
of scale in housework. 

